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Taking into account uncertainties in the governance of a liberal economic reform leads to a 
challenging paradox. Economic reform requires institutional stability, which is guaranteed by the 
independence of the economic regulation authorities from political influence and by a loyalty to 
initial institutional commitments and international standards. However, all economic reform 
includes a degree of uncertainty in its results, even if it is inspired by experiments from 
comparable countries (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007). Uncertainties are related to national 
characteristics or political dynamic or economic conditions (Djelic and Quack 2007). The more 
the reform is liberal, the more the economic actors are free to develop their own strategy, and the 
more the effects are uncertain (Schneiberg and Bartley 2010). This uncertainty can be reduced 
during the implementation of the reform: learning from experience may lead national 
governments or independent regulatory authorities to introduce adjustments to contain the most 
problematic effects. Nevertheless, adjustments are limited by the initial institutional 
commitments and institutionalized standards (Carruthers 2007). Institutional stability and 
coherence issues may prevent political intervention, especially when the country is committed to 
international trade agreements (Zelner, Henisz, and G. 2009).    
The liberalization of the electricity sector in France (implementation of a wholesale market, 
opening to competitors) is an interesting example of this paradox (Reverdy, 2014). This reform 
has met a strong contradiction between the constraint for institutional continuity and coherence, 
and the request from economic actors for political intervention on the market organization (to 
ensure economic continuity through price stability). This strong contradiction comes from the 
economic uncertainties associated with the electricity market price. This market price has a high 
sensitivity due to the investment costs and implementation delays and the non-storable nature of 
electricity. A liberal reform can have very significant effects on the costs and the margins of 
economic actors, producers and industrial customers, redistributing losses and incomes. In 
France, the wholesale price increased (200 % between 2004 and 2008) in the context of a relative 
stabilization of average production costs of electricity, and convergence towards an equilibrium 
price was not guaranteed. The price increase produced a political crisis and a contestation of the 
liberal reform by French industrial customers. The French government faced a dilemma between 
institutional stability (not changing the rules and the adopted market model) and economic 
stability (moratorium of the reform, political control of the price). 
After a trial and error process, an intermediate strategy has been found between institutional 
stability and economic stability: a ―redesign‖ of the market, attentive to the maintenance of major 
economic and political equilibrium, and compatible with major European commitments. But this 
solution hasn't been found immediately. It was the result of a long exploratory process, marked 
by several attempts and failures, mainly involving the actors of the French market, political 
authorities and the European Commission (Directorate General for Competition). This 
exploratory process includes technical, legal, and political dimensions. During the process, 
political authorities played a key role, whereas one could have expect that they might delegate 
this adaptation of the market to regulatory authorities.   
By articulating the sociology of science and technology to new institutionalist theory in 
sociology, this communication describes this exploratory adaptation process of a highly 
institutionalized economic model. In a context where economic expertise gain legitimacy and 
authority in the market organization, mobilizing contradictory expertise plays a key role in the 
adaptation process. This expertise can highlight the contradictions and uncertainties of market 
models and undermine the legitimacy of the regulatory authorities who derive their legitimacy 
from these models. This weakening of knowledge and of the regulators allows politicians to 
regain control, to produce new rules, to present them as adaptations of the market and therefore to 
present an apparent compliance to institutional commitments. The contradiction between 
economic stability and institutional stability is therefore enabled by a certain flexibility of market 
models. It remains to specify the extent and the conditions of this flexibility, as well as the nature 
of possible adaptations in an existing institutional framework. 
The first section of the communication will explain how research in economic sociology takes 
account of the tension between the international standards and rules and national political 
dynamics. Then, it will explicit our hypotheses concerning the processes engaged in the 
flexibility of market models. In a second, empirical, section, it will address the case of the French 
electricity market, emphasizing the dynamic of flexibility, through deinstitutionalization of the 
market model implemented in European countries, the search for alternatives and the redesign of 
the market organization. In a third section, the communication will revisit the notion of « flexible 
institution », applied here to a market model: an institution that is sufficiently stable, 
recognizable, shared, founded, in order to be legitimate and to give legitimacy to those who 
appeal to her, but which remains, in a certain number of conditions, ―adaptable‖ to specific 
circumstances, integrating political contingencies and decoupling from institutional 
commitments. 
The flexibility of economic model 
Economic sociology has produced many proves that liberal economic policies diffuse at an 
international level, held by international rules and economic expertise. In Europe, the European 
Commission and the Competition rules contribute to stability and to compliance with 
international standards. How economic sociology can explain the flexibility of economic 
standards and their adaptation to local political configurations and unexpected effects?  
The diffusion of market models 
According to Richard Scott (2001), an economic practice has three institutional pillars that 
support its power and stability: a cognitive pillar, consisting of knowledge and beliefs; a 
normative pillar, consisting of assessments and values; and a coercive pillar, consisting 
essentially of rules and coercive techniques. A mechanism of diffusion corresponds to each of 
these institutional pillars. The three pillars are influencing each other. When these pillars are 
consistent with each other, this gives a strong legitimacy to economic practices. 
Concerning the sector of electricity, it is possible to characterize a model of market organization 
that has been institutionalized through economic expertise and competition rules. The 
liberalization of national electricity sectors rely on a set of shared intellectual foundations within 
an expert community of economists. This community transformed economic matters, usually 
considered as political issues, into technical issues that can be processed by independent 
bureaucratic structures (Dezalay and Garth 2005, Kogut and MacPherson 2007, Fourcade 2006). 
More precisely: in Europe, the liberalization of different network industries was based on a 
doctrine and an expertise developed in Anglo-Saxon countries. If the action of the Commission 
can be qualified as political - it aimed to revive a halting European integration (Jabko, 2006) - it 
is impossible to deny that it obtained its legitimacy from economic expertise and prevailing 
competition rules. The Commission could also rely on European legislation, with the support of 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities, to extend the rules of the single market to 
network industries (Schmidt 1998, Schmidt 2000, Woll, 2009). Once these sectors had been 
liberalized, economic activities were subject to the same requirements as other economic 
activities in terms of competition. Regulation of these sectors found a legal foundation already 
well established at European level, applied to almost all economic sectors and includes the rules 
against cartel, concentrations and state aid (Cini 2001; Cini and McGowan 1998; Fligstein and 
Sweet 2002). 
The competition regulation has been reinforced by the strengthening of the Directorate General 
for Competition and other independent regulatory authorities, such as the Competition Authority 
in France (Djelic and Kleiner 2006). These authorities rely on law to arbitrate in disputes 
concerning the organization of markets. They also use economic expertise and borrow to 
academic knowledge its definition of an efficient market, with the equilibrium mechanism of 
supply and demand as the main method for achieving collective wealth (Veljanovski 2010). Thus, 
by limiting the regulation of the economy to the organization of competition and by defining this 
competition with the help of economic expertise, the equilibrium mechanism of supply and 
demand through prices has gained a strong normativity. The definition by the economic expertise 
of the conditions of market efficiency has become the main reference that guides the work of 
independent regulatory authorities. It also provides tools and concepts in order to identify market 
failures (neoclassical economics, new institutional economics, game theory). 
This economic expertise has organized itself, by referring to academic knowledge, in order to 
form a set of references. Thus we defend the existing of an « institutionalized market model » in 
the case of the electricity sector. In addition, the role of economic expertise has been strengthened 
since the regulation of competition was less interested in market structures than in market 
player‘s strategies of price manipulation. To detect price manipulation supposes to be able to say 
what would have been a ―normal‖ price, something only market simulation can do (Breslau 
2011). 
The mobilization of this expertise enables local adaptations of these reforms. Academic 
economists promote "market design" activities, which use economic theory, simulation and 
experimental methods, to adapt the rules, the methods of price monitoring and the technical 
devices for auction, in close dialogue with regulators (MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007). The 
diversity of deregulation experiences, particularly in the United States (Marty, 2004) counted as 
life-size experimentation. Regulatory authorities seek academic economists support to clarify the 
operating procedures of these markets, adapted in a way they respect the requirements of 
economic efficiency rationality (Breslau, 2011). 
Independent regulatory authorities are not exempt from the phenomenon of cognitive and 
political capture. The process of development of market rules is often entrusted to experts whose 
independence towards existing economic powers can not be guaranteed. The legal and economic 
principles are often sufficiently abstract and distant, in order for the expertise to maintain a 
considerable flexibility in categorizing practices, and therefore in the choice of principles that 
apply (Huault and Montagner 2009). Free spaces primarily benefit principally to experts often 
mandated by economic actors themselves: production of rules is "privatized" (Chiapello and 
Medjad 2009). 
Thus, in this market regulation, we can question the interdependence between expertise and 
independent regulatory authorities. The transfer of power from political authorities to 
independent regulatory authorities requires a development of their legitimacy, which would be 
associated with the expertise they invoke. We can expect that, in order to avoid contestation, 
independent regulatory authorities must rely on non-questionable knowledge, who should 
therefore be the most universal and rational possible. But, reversely, it is still possible that a 
powerful contestation of the knowledge would be able to question the legitimacy of the 
independent regulatory authority. 
How economic and political actors exploit uncertainties in order to circumvent institutional 
pressure 
Beside this first group of research insisting on legalization and standardization of market 
regulation, a second group of research insist instead on policy interventions involved into the 
liberalization process. Rainer Eising and Nicolas Jabko (2001) evoke the negotiations ahead of 
the liberalization directives in the electricity market, where national political authorities 
repeatedly intervened. Bennet Zelner, Witold Henisz and Guy Holburn (2009) identify many 
liberal reforms of the electricity sector in the world, where governments do not respect their 
commitments towards private investors after liberalization: non-respected purchase prizes, price 
that were imposed by the state, renationalization ... Although not as visible as the retrenchment 
mentioned by this study, the gaps between international economic rules as adopted by countries 
and local practices are common when it comes to the implementation of significant economic 
reforms (Carruthers and Halliday 2006; Boyle and Meyer 2002). These gaps can be sustained by 
practices that John Meyer and Brian Rowan (1977) call decoupling. This concept refers to 
various methods that allow to maintain the gap between external requirements, considered as 
rational and universal (eg, international rules), and local practices (at the level of a country), 
despite a formal commitment to respect these external requirements. Decoupling is usually made 
possible by a weak compliance monitoring (Bromley and Powell, 2012), by superficial 
compliance or by maintaining an ambiguity about the rules and an opacity on actual practices. It 
often comes from the existence of issues that are competing and conflicting with the overall rule. 
Although we can not avoid this second hypothesis, it is difficult to privilege it definitely. 
According to Patricia Bromley and Walter Powell (2012), the gaps between adopted formal rules 
and practices in the business world tend to get reduced, due to the rationalization of the latter. 
Audit and control techniques as well as coercive technics have never been developed. This 
applies to European competition law, which is based on a strong compliance mechanism and 
where economic players are themselves involved in monitoring the application of the rule 
(Fligstein and Stone Sweet, 2002). European countries belong rather to the configuration 
identified by Bennet Zelner and his colleagues (2009), described as unfavorable to turnovers and 
to non-compliance with market rules. In this context, the margins would be narrower than in 
countries less constrained by legal commitments. 
It is therefore important to explain how political actors have been able to regain a certain power 
in the trajectory of these liberal reforms. The explanation can be based on research that examines 
more in detail how economic expertise is exercised. Thus, sociology of science and technics 
shows that the economic theory and simulation tools takes an important role in the process of 
transformation of these very "artificialized" markets (Levin and Espeland 2002). The pricing 
practices depends on the development of information technology (Callon and Muniesa, 2005) and 
on mathematic formulas (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003). These devices, once they are mobilized in 
practice, produce unexpected effects that do not necessarily correspond to the initial wish or to 
the promises associated with them (MacKenzie 2008; Veal and Mouzas 2012). The artificial and 
sophisticated nature of financial markets and energy offers opportunities for technical 
controversies (Callon and Muniesa, 2009), whose resolution depends on cognitive or normative 
influences toward independent regulatory authorities (Mirowski and Nik- Khah, 2007, Dumez 
and Jeunemaitre 1998). 
Sociology of science and technics suggest the hypothesis that a strong technical controversy over 
the organization of a market, driven by a powerful coalition, can weaken the legitimacy of the 
institutionalized market model to the point of politicizing the debate and therefore, encourage 
political intervention in the organization of the market. 
This hypothesis can be based on neo-institutionalism, which explains that the production of new 
knowledge and the formation of a political coalition can affect an institutionalized model by 
attacking its cognitive pillar, its ―taken-for-grandness‖, i.e. the belief and opacity which hitherto 
permitted it to be accepted without discussion (Maguire and Hardy 2009). What was considered 
as being obvious until the controversy, can lose that status and become an arbitrary belief or even 
a hypothesis that could be falsified. It should be known for whom and under what circumstances 
a statement remains a belief or becomes questionable assumption. 
The weakening of the cognitive pillar leads sooner or later to the weakening of the normative 
pillar: it is difficult to continue to give a positive value to a practice if the beliefs that justify it are 
weakened (Caronna 2004). Similarly, rules that allow a practice can hardly be maintained for a 
long period if the practice is challenged in terms of its effectiveness and when it is seen 
negatively by public opinion. The weakening of the technical foundations can facilitate a return 
to political and economic actors, who were initially kept away (Kubo and Morgan 2005). 
According to Steve Maguire and Cynthia Hardy (2009), the sociology of translation (Callon, 
1986) can address these recompositions. It enlightens the diversity of possible attitudes of the 
actors towards the institutions, their level of adherence to the different pillars identified by 
Richard Scott (2001), and take into account all the argumentative, legal or technical associations 
that stabilize institutions. Practices that were considered as institutionalized are actually 
composite doctrines, formed by a set of statements, beliefs and rules, related between each other 
by various argumentations, but can also lose some of their coherence, their status of obviousness, 
of value, or rule (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). When contestation occurs, actors can develop 
new discursive strategies, new problematizations relying on experts discourse. The 
deinstitutionalization process is produced by the weakening of the many associations between 
technical, political or legal arguments. The institutionalization process implies on the contrary a 
mobilization of new resources and the finding of new argumentative associations. 
Each of the instances has its own criteria of validity: economic expertise, political debate or legal 
action. Quoting Michel Foucault, Steve Maguire and Cynthia Hardy (2009) state that "truth" is 
what society accepts as true, through mechanisms that distinguish right from wrong, that grant 
status to certain actors to say what is true and what is not. That is why the maintenance or 
renewal of an institutional practice is related to production of statements and with the forum that 
recognize them as valid and who each have their own stabilization modality. The cognitive pillar 
stabilizes by the accumulation of measurements, modeling and simulations, by the verification of 
the internal validity of arguments, but also, the social position of experts, their link with the 
academic field. Economic expertise is not only a matter of ideology or interests. The political 
pillar will stabilize by the formation of a coalition that will recognize a proposal as acceptable: 
this coalition has to defend its legitimacy into the political arena. The legal pillar will stabilize 
market organization by the verification of compliance with existing law. But these three dynamic 
of institutionalization do not operate totally independently of each other. For example, the 
judicial activity is never totally indifferent from political agreement or disagreement. 
Method 
Our research approach is based on the distinction proposed by Richard Scott (2001) between the 
three pillars of an institutionalized practice: the cognitive pillar, consisting of knowledge and 
beliefs; the normative pillar, made by assessments and values; and coercive pillar, consisting 
essentially of rules and means of coercion. We also rely on the analysis of de-institutionalization 
process by Steve Maguire and Cynthia Hardy (2009) who associated with each of the three pillars 
specific spaces for debate in which the various problematizations of an economic practice can 
unfold. 
The cognitive pillar is easily recognizable in the work of experts and scholars, who contribute to 
the objectification of the debate by mobilizing economic inquiries and modeling capacities. The 
debate takes place via publications that engage the credibility of the authors, qualified as experts. 
The normative pillar refers to the debate in the public space, where values and political 
judgments are associated with economic practices. Basically, it is reflected by publications, 
releases, political debates, issued by economic and political actors. The coercive pillar concerns 
the debates within (or associated with) the independent regulatory authorities, the use of rules of 
law, the way a practice is allowed, tolerated or forbidden... This demands a precise examination 
of the way these rules are actually implemented, and therefore of the action of control and 
sanction of independent regulatory authorities. 
The distinction between the three pillars must be applied carefully and must not be affected 
definitively to specific actors. Each actor and authority request different sources of legitimacy 
even if some of them are more important for them: economic actors defend technical arguments 
and contribute to their validation, economics experts defend also political or legal arguments, 
political authorities defend technical arguments against independent authority…    
In our approach, we have also been careful to identify the strategic issues of the economic actors, 
their losses and profits associated with different market rules. This analysis helps to explain their 
motivations, although it does not explain their argumentative strategy, neither what can make its 
success or failure. Although it is tempting to read the different decisions as the effect of a 
coalition of several economic and political actors, an approach focused on the economic interests 
does not provide an explanation on the ability of the coalition to keep its goals. 
For each decision, we therefore investigated prior positions, mainly through literature review. 
Interviews with actors has allowed us to investigate key elements of negotiations and main 
motivations of decisions. We have considered the public comments by the actors once the 
decisions had been taken. We have identify the shifts in requirements from independent 
regulatory authorities, when they agree to push to the limit on the validity of rules and applicable 
standards. Finally, we reconstructed the succession of decisions since every decision creates a 
new situation that becomes the context of the following decision. The reform of the reform is an 
incremental process.  
The flexibility of the institutionalized model of electricity market in France 
The presentation of the case allows us to specify the mechanisms at work in the implementation 
and adaptation of an institutionalized marked model. First of all, it explains the process of 
adoption of a market model characterized by the same techniques of exchange and by the same 
rules from one country to another in Europe. Secondly, it evokes the collective mobilization, the 
circumvention of European competition regulation authority and use of expertise in order to 
contest this institutionalized model. Finally, it explains how economic expertise and legal 
arguments have been mobilized by political actors to design an alternative model for the 
electricity market, consistent with the political expectations and sufficiently consistent with 
knowledge and institutionalized rules. 
The adoption of an taken-for-granted model of market 
Let us examine more in detail the story of the debates and the readjustments of the electricity 
market. Our observations show that during the first years of liberalization in continental Europe 
(before 2004), the European Commission and national regulators have been working to develop 
an integrated European market for electricity, by facilitating cross-border trade by organizing a 
network of independent regulators in each country, by establishing interconnected spot markets 
and by fighting against existing monopolies. 
This means not only just a deregulation: network industries continue to be the subject of specific 
technical regulation, in particular to facilitate third party access to the network, but also to 
encourage new entrants. Furthermore, electricity has the characteristic of being a non-storable 
good, for which the production and consumption must fit precisely in real time. The market must 
achieve the balance of production and consumption through the formation of a price. 
French industrialists campaigned in favor of liberalization before the European Commission. As 
in many countries, the most active opponents to liberalization were the unions of the national 
electricity and gas companies. Taking into account French specifics, and especially the extent of 
the nuclear power and hydropower base, the government considered that the short-term effects 
would be negligible. The government was confident about the long-term advantages. At most, it 
expected to see some new renewable energy players, whom they indeed intended to promote. The 
government focused above all on maintaining cohesion with other European countries.  
The opening up of the electricity markets was accompanied by a phase of euphoria during which 
industrialists invested in learning new purchasing techniques: calls for tender, mutual agreements, 
fixed or indexed prices, auctioning, etc. Most industrialists exercised their eligibility, i.e. their 
right to buy electricity on the free market when it was opened (except those benefiting from a 
long-term contract at a preferential rate). Prices on the wholesale markets diminished, confirming 
the ―promises‖ of competitive markets.  
Given the specificity of the electricity market, in particular the difficulty of organizing third party 
access to the network and the permanent balancing of production and consumption, most 
European countries chose to set up specialized independent regulators. These controllers are 
networked, share their knowledge, draw on existing experience and have developed roughly the 
same technical standards and coordinated the establishment of spot markets. The European 
market, as developed from 2000, benefited from the accumulated expertise and devices 
developed in other countries, particularly the United States, where liberalization has led to a 
variety of more or less successful experiences. 
As noted by Daniel Breslau (2013), economic expertise is put in practice in a pragmatic way: it 
does not impose Walrasian model, but deals with the technical and material constraints of the 
market, while taking reference on various simulations, as if the market was not hampered by such 
constraints. Daniel Breslau calls this practice "Applied Platonism": a modeled market, freed from 
constraints, serves as a reference to assess the price prevailing in the real market. When the 
constraints introduced by the actors or the regulator, turn the market operation away from the 
theoretical market, the expert recommends compensation. 
This economic expertise has produced a set of rules of reference which enabled, in Europe, to 
stabilize an organizational model, and this model serves as an institution (Scott, 2001). This 
institutionalized market is supported both by theorized representations and on technical devices. 
In practice, this means an electronic auction which aggregates and prioritizes daily offers and 
requests for the next day and set a price to meet the two curves of supply and demand. An 
algorithm determines the meeting by linear interpolation of the two curves and gives the "market 
clearing price". This price is used as a reference for all transactions managed by the auction. It 
also serves as a reference for many other transactions, including medium-term contracts and 
futures. A second market, driven by the network operator, also manages the gaps between 
forecasts and actual instant production and consumption. 
The calculation of price offers is based on a technique that is widely shared by electricity 
producers: the marginal cost curve of power facilities, classified by merit order. This curve 
allows an operator to set a price offer for the volume of electricity it will propose on the spot 
market. This calculation method is based on the following reasoning: given the non-storable 
nature of electricity and strong variations in electricity consumption, the power generation firms 
has interest to exploit several different technologies, that have different incremental costs and 
who are mobilized in order of merit in accordance with the increase in consumption (Bohn, 
Caramanis and Schweppe 1984). To provide demand, the electrical industry can use equipment 
that is expensive in investment, but whose functioning costs are low and who do not depend on 
the quantity produced, such as nuclear power plants. For peak demand, it can use cheaper means 
of production by investment, but overall more expensive, which can produce on demand with 
higher variable costs, such as oil or gas power plants. This calculation technique plays a central 
role in price variations in the short and medium term. It is also justified by an economic 
simulation which shows that the market price can lead to the convergence of the investment 
strategies of the actors toward an optimum electric park (Laffont and Tirole 1993). 
Market actor have agreed together with the regulator to adopt this calculation formula, which is 
also used by regulators in market control. Indeed, this market is subject to close monitoring of 
prices and investments to verify that there has been no agreement or abuse of dominant positions, 
a monitoring that has been justified by many economists (Joskow 2003). This performative 
character of price calculation models allows us to understand the importance of conflicts between 
actors and the regulator in the justification on the settings for this model. For example, the 
marginal cost curve of power generation, ranked by order of merit, is the subject of controversy 
among actors and the regulator, which are generally arbitrated by a technical discussion or by the 
use of academic expertise. 
Finally, the construction of the European electricity market passes through a coupling of the 
various national markets. Border connections, previously developed for security objectives 
concerning the electricity grid, were massively required for economic exchange. And regulators 
have encouraged third party access to the gas transport infrastructure, facilitating trade again. 
These couplings have been systematically sought inside Europe through an economic integration 
policy. The evolution of the material and contractual infrastructure has been complemented by an 
IT-infrastructure that has gradually connected transactions between market players from one 
country to another, thus constituting interconnected European markets. 
Identification of an unexpected effect of market liberalization: a price increase  
When the decision to liberalize the French market was validated, economic and political actors 
never anticipated the resulting price increase. After having benefited from a particularly attractive 
price compared with the regulated tariff, the electricity market faced a substantial increase with 
the rise in oil prices, to such an extent that the market rate largely exceeded the regulated rate 
albeit based on production costs. Electricity-intensive industrialists were the first to point out this 
increase in 2003. It was seen to be unjustified when compared with production costs in France. 
The industrialists publicly expressed their concerns: they felt that the low prices they obtained 
during the first years had been a trap. They suspected that the producers had agreed together to 
increase their prices. The highly concentrated structure of the market, with competition limited 
mainly to the historical producers, seemed to point to a price fixing agreement.  
Faced with the industrialists‘ mobilization, the French government was slow to react. During this 
period, the Finance Ministry was very active in setting up the operation to open up the capital of 
the French electricity producer EDF. Given the context, EDF‘s electricity sales prices also 
enhanced the value of the company, and therefore the profit to be gained from the sale of its 
capital. The French government was also a prisoner of its own consistency. The liberalization of 
the market and the privatization of EDF supposed a freedom in price fixing, this being the basic 
principle underlying any competitive market.  
But at the beginning of 2004, the Economy and Finance Ministry asked the General Council of 
Mines and the General Finance Inspectorate to study the market‘s operation and hence shed light 
on the debate. Performed by members of both administrative bodies, this mission was based on a 
series of interviews and the collection of economic data from a long list of stakeholder, including 
European actors. The committee collected the arguments produced by EDF and, in particular, the 
market model promoted by the company. It also put this theory to the test, comparing it to the 
empirical data to which it had access.  
The report provided a long explanation of the spot pricing model on the wholesale electricity 
markets, a model which all economists agreed with. The explanation was based on micro-
economic reasoning: a highly competitive market sets prices at the level of the producer‘s 
marginal cost, and the marginal cost curve follows a ―merit order.‖ EDF used this ―marginal 
electricity production cost‖ to justify the increase in market prices and the difference between 
market prices and its production cost. In accordance with this theory, in a single French-German 
electricity market, it was normal for the wholesale market spot price to be aligned with the 
marginal costs of the most expensive installations used to meet marginal demand, i.e. with the 
German installations using coal and fuel. As the marginal cost of these installations was far 
greater than the complete cost of the nuclear power generation, the market introduced a market 
price different from the average production cost. The market created an important economic rent 
for the producer EDF. The difference between the average production cost and the market price 
was not acceptable for these industrialists, given the favorable tariffs they had been granted by 
EDF at the request of the State.  
The IGF-CGM report was nevertheless very cautious when it came to checking this theory using 
empirical means. The committee attempted to study prices on Powernext, the electricity 
exchange, and assess how the marginal cost theory was applied. The wholesale market price 
analysis did clearly show the correlation between the French market price and the German market 
prices for term-based contracts. This correlation ties in with economic theory in the case of a 
perfectly interconnected Franco-German market. To prevent objections being raised by the DG 
Competition, EDF followed the shared economic model (applied to the Franco-German 
―interconnected electricity network‖). EDF had to prove that it was not attempting to maintain its 
dominant position through overly low prices, or misusing this position by applying overly high 
prices. The prices granted to industrialists ―mechanically‖ followed the wholesale market price in 
line with the marginal cost theory. 
As Marcel Boiteux, a French economist and CEO of EDF for many years, emphasizes, ―it is no 
longer a question of opening up competition in order to reduce prices, as one might have initially 
believed, but of raising prices to allow competition. What a superb paradox…‖  
Deconstruction of the market model  
French academic economists joined the debate in 2006. The first paper to focus on the debates 
concerning the difference between the production price of French electricity and the market price 
was published in 2006 by David Spector, a member of the Paris School of Economics. He shared 
the conclusion of the IGF-CGM report. Dominique Finon and Jean-Michel Glachant, two other 
economists specialized in energy markets did the same. All agreed that this ―rent‖ should be 
maintained, if not increased, in the future: the current market price reflected the scarcity of 
nuclear power plants, and in order to offset such an imbalance there would have to be massive 
investments in nuclear power across Europe, resulting in capacity being at least doubled. 
However, the other European states were more than reticent to go nuclear. And France would not 
be able to produce and export an equivalent volume, owing to both technical and political 
reasons. Basically, in a single European electricity market, EDF would have lasting benefits and 
inevitably generate a considerable amount of ―rent.‖  
The price increase led to a political debate where economic experts (administration, companies 
and academics) worked to identify market dysfunctions. These experts were largely inspired by 
the same specialized literature and circulate in the same networks, even if their political and 
ideological sensibility could be different (Bockman and Eyal, 2002). The activity of these 
networks played an essential role in clarifying the diagnosis.  
Market modeling contributed to the understanding of the market and the anticipation of its 
development. It explained how a difference between the market price and the production cost is 
formed and gave credibility to the scenario of an increase in income with the opening of the 
French market to competition. Market modeling led to the shared conviction in France that more 
competition on the electricity market would not lead to a drop in prices, and would not encourage 
prices to be aligned with an average production cost. Economic modeling highlighted the specific 
case of the French market and made it possible to deconstruct the principle, albeit largely shared, 
on which all European policy was based: ―the opening of markets to competition brings prices 
down‖. 
The rapid emergence of the controversy in France, and the forming of an agreement based on the 
difference between market prices and production costs being interpreted as a scarcity rent, 
testifies to active and pluralist economic expertise that understands the mechanisms specific to 
electricity markets and is able to delve into a wealth of different references. Thierry de Bresson, 
probably the most reputed economist among electricity-intensive industrialists, put forward other 
forms of market organization that avoided the price formation mechanism he denounced. He 
made use of economic theory to defend alternative market organizations which do not produce 
the same effect in terms of price, as long-term contracts for large consumers, which are adopted 
in Australia, the United States, Canada, and New Zealand. 
European Commission defending the institutionalized model 
Economic experts in France, whether they worked for the administration, the university, EDF or 
industry, agreed on the technical diagnosis of the situation. The European Commission has never 
officially discussed this diagnose, neither confirming nor invalidating it. The DG Competition 
was still convinced that the main problems were still due to the absence of effective competition 
on the European market, due to its overly heavy concentration, and even to the deliberate 
strategies of some players to increase market prices. All of the difficulties generated by market 
opening have been interpreted in one way: liberalization has not gone far enough.  
The highly concentrated structure of the market called for closer monitoring of exchanges and 
price formation. This is why at the end of 2005, the DG Competition decided to undertake an 
enquiry into the level of competition on the markets. It thus responded to the concerns of many 
governments and economic actors faced with the constant increase in electricity and gas prices. 
The objective of the report was also to respond to the current controversies. 
In the report, the DG Competition emphasized its conviction that a structurally more open market 
would lead to virtuous behavior in market players. It claimed that this conviction was shared by 
most economic actors consulted. More surprising still, from a French viewpoint, was the DG 
Competition‘s acceptance of a high electricity price level: it considered that a high price level 
was not necessarily a sign of market dysfunction and could have a positive effect on investment 
decisions. Some experts have reproached the Commission for having transformed the sector‘s 
enquiry, initially described as a midway market opening feedback, into an enquiry limited to the 
assessment of the level of competition. 
The main problem identified in the report was that a high price level in a highly concentrated 
market would not necessarily lead to investment given that producers could share out the income 
amongst themselves. This is why the DG Competition again emphasized the need to move ahead 
with market liberalization so that competition operated in a satisfactory manner and focused on 
the disintegration of the energy sectors (separation between production, transportation, 
distribution, etc.). The market model itself and its redistributive effects were not discussed.  
For French political and economic actors, the European Commission seemed to be trapped by the 
institutional frame that had been guiding its policy since the Treaty of Rome and the creation of 
the Single Market, as well as its efforts to counterbalance the specific, political and economic 
interests of individual European states. The European Single Market had become an objective in 
itself and its legitimacy could not be undermined. It had been built on formalized, dense, robust, 
cumulative institutions. Since its legitimacy was at stake when market opening was evaluated, the 
European Commission refused to explore and formally recognize the unexpected effects of the 
model it defended. The French industrialists remained highly critical of the action of the DG 
Competition, reproaching it for devoting more effort to imposing its market model than assessing 
its consequences on the economy.  
The search for alternatives  
Via the union of energy-using industries (UNIDEN, accounting for 70% of the industrial energy 
consumed in France), the industrialists demanded that regulated prices be re-institutionalized for 
industrialists. However, for the French government, which was in the process of organizing the 
liberalization of the entire market, there was no question of going back to regulated prices. 
Nevertheless, the Minister of Industry, Francis Mer (himself a former manager from the 
electricity-intensive industry) was especially sensitive to what the electricity-intensive users were 
saying.  
The IGF-CGM committee drew inspiration from the Finish PWR, financed by a consortium of 
electricity-consuming industrialists. The idea was to transpose this approach to France, i.e. to set 
up a purchasing consortium that would sign a long-term contract with EDF.  
The consortium was the object of several discussions between UNIDEM and EDF and with the 
Ministry of Industry. Nevertheless, throughout this negotiation, the prices offered to high energy 
consumers constantly varied, re-opening the controversy about nuclear power production costs. 
Several times, UNIDEN representatives threatened EDF with State arbitration. Paradoxically, the 
more public the price debates became, the more they weakened the considerable efforts 
undertaken until then to prove that EDF could join the consortium without being subject to 
political pressures.  
The IGF-CGM report imposed restrictive conditions of access to the consortium in order to stave 
off the Commission‘s objections. Access was thus reserved to ―electricity-intensive industrialists 
that could relocate abroad‖. This is probably the compromise that the Government had forged 
between the Ministry of Industry, whose aim was to protect the most exposed industries, and the 
Ministry of Finance, whose aim was to maintain EDF‘s profitability. Nevertheless, the eligibility 
criteria gradually changed as non-eligible industrialists began to react. When the energy law was 
being drafted in 2006, a new agreement was outlined based on a new definition of electricity-
intensive industry and less restrictive criteria. This meant that a bigger volume would be involved 
if all industrialists wished to participate.  
Following exchanges with the DG Competition, the work on legitimization also evolved: the 
initial arguments were replaced. The consortium emphasized that its aim was to meet the urgent 
need of the highly indebted electricity producer to finance its development using new means. The 
search for institutional alternatives in France has to be placed in the context of European 
commitments: European directives about the energy sector and the Single Market rules.  The 
French State could not reorganize the electric market without searching for legal validity from the 
European Commission.  
Before the Ministry of Industry supported the Exeltium consortium, it wanted to make sure that 
this solution would be accepted by the DG Competition. Indeed, the competition authority might 
accuse the French State of subsidizing its industrial activity via a favorable long-term contract. 
The simple fact that the State was a majority shareholder was bound to arouse the suspicions of 
the DG Competition. To justify this setup before the DG Competition, it had to be proved that 
both the contract and the price remained ―plausible‖, in other words, that it was in the interest of 
EDF to sign a long-term contract at a price below the market price. 
The report then based its arguments on judicial precedents authorizing a specific price for a 
customer when the loss of such a customer would be detrimental to production. In line with this 
argument, the contract would therefore only concern electricity-intensive industrialists: if the 
price did shoot up, these industrialists would have to relocate their production and EDF stood to 
lose a substantial amount of revenue if this happened. The committee therefore had to identify the 
industrial activities at risk to be transferred abroad.  
The IGF-CGM report stipulated the conditions under which the price of such a long-term contract 
would be fixed. It pointed out that community case law decisions required public companies to 
invoice ―according to normal market conditions‖. Failing this, the DG Competition would 
compare prices to the complete cost of the services in question, i.e. to the sum of operating costs 
and return on capital, including private equity. 
So, this credible alternative was weakened with a multitude of contradictions, the most obvious 
of which was the following: trying to get the State to arbitrate while attempting to show that the 
setup was conceivable without its support. The supposed strategic behavior of the economic 
players in an idealized market – i.e. what EDF could do if it was not a state-owned company in a 
monopolistic situation – was used as a reference to draw up the partnership contract, calculate the 
prices, etc.  
Normally, the DG Competition should not have been able to oppose the drawing up of long-term 
contracts, identified as a means of encouraging investment, especially when the electricity sale 
price was supposed to cover the cost of building a new PWR. However, the DG Competition 
evaluated the Exeltium case in a ―structuralist‖ approach. The degree of electricity sector 
concentration in France was extremely high and long-term contracts with a dominant supplier 
were likely to worsen this situation. The consortium had attempted to get around this argument 
by organizing a bigger call for tender (only EDF fulfilled the criteria) but the DG Competition 
used the structuralist argument to ask for a reduction in the volume to be distributed by the 
consortium. The authority requested that members of the consortium would be allowed to sell 
electricity on the wholesale market, so that this market would have a bigger supply in terms of 
volume.  
Thus, the controversy moved from a diagnosis to a discussion of solutions, from economic 
modeling to legal qualification. As the legal and economic discussions progressed, the actors 
realized that there was no immediately applicable institutional resource. They explored politically 
acceptable solutions, which they reformulated in legal and economic arguments wherever 
possible. Cornered by its own contradictions, DG Competition could not reproach EDF and 
French industrialists for an industrial agreement with a price guaranteed to provide a return on 
investment. There was a tacit agreement not to disagree with the price, which shows that the 
market opening led to a higher price than was needed to cover the costs of the investments.  
A retrenchment: the return to the regulated tariff 
During 2005, while French industrialists were heavily involved in setting up the consortium, they 
also understood that this would not provide them with easy access to electricity at a reasonable 
price. This was even truer given that there would be likely delays in setting up of the consortium 
while electricity prices continued to rise and the need to act became urgent. While Exeltium was 
being set up, different industrial customer associations actively lobbied the French parliament in 
favor of a new regulated tariff. They used the formalization of the price formation mechanism to 
justify their defense of maintaining regulated tariffs. They were supported by members of 
parliament for different parties. 
French Parliamentarians used a legal opportunity to grab the issue: while the parliamentary 
debate focused on the possibility for individual consumers to return to a regulated tariff, which 
they had abandoned, parliamentarians managed to embed a new tariff for industry in the law: the 
―Transient Market Adjustment Regulated Tariff‖ or ―Tartam.‖ The justification given for this 
new tariff pointed to the distortions in competition between industrial customers who had 
subscribed to market offers and those who had remained loyal to the historical supplier. The tariff 
defined within the framework of the Tartam was 20 to 30% higher than the existing regulated 
tariff but remained much lower than the market price. In August 2008, France decided to extend 
this mechanism until June 30, 2010 and to open it up to new beneficiaries. 
Unlike the Exeltium consortium setup, which the European Commission had been willing to 
accept, the setting up of a new tariff, the Tartam, was bound to trigger a virulent response and 
worsen relations between the French State and the European Commission. From the point of view 
of the DG Competition, the Tartam was a sacrilege since it consisted of re-introducing a 
regulated tariff which should be reserved for very specific situations of vulnerable individual 
consumers. This initiative broke away from the very cautious strategy adopted until then and 
which had led the UNIDEN and the Ministry of Industry to regularly consult the DG Competition 
and set up proposals that complied as much as possible with European law on competition. In 
2007, the DG Competition opened a formal procedure to examine aid supposedly granted in favor 
of large and medium-sized enterprises in France in the form of an artificially low level of 
regulated industrial electricity tariffs, financed either directly or indirectly by the State. This 
procedure led to France‘s condemnation in 2009: the Tartam was considered as illegal State aid 
because it was selective (the tariff was considered as advantageous to electricity-intensive 
consumers).   
This retrenchment can be considered as a reactivation of a specific economic culture in a 
problematic situation, leading to local reinterpretation and specific solutions (Dobbin, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the interventionist industrial political culture that existed in France cannot alone 
explain this turnaround. National economic organizations and economic doctrines have been 
made highly uniform under pressure from European institutions. Furthermore, France has also 
experienced its government‘s substantial disengagement from industry owing to European 
integration (Schmidt, 2003). 
This retrenchment is better explained by the substantial inertia of the economic model of the 
French electricity sector, based on the nuclear industry. This model is concretely objectified in 
the nation‘s nuclear power plants, but also in its electricity-intensive industry, its transport 
system, and in the consumer practices of private individuals (electrical heating). It is based on an 
extremely centralized system where the power is shared between the State and EDF, who are 
closely interdependent. This model is organized around agreements that give the access to 
electricity at its production cost. In spite of all the criticism, this model has retained considerable 
legitimacy because it constitutes the material reality of the French nation‘s lighting, heating, 
transport, and everyday work. But the introduction of the market pool disconnects this technical 
and economic association, by introducing the wholesale market price between producers and 
electricity-intensive industry. With a price that is more than twice the production costs, the spread 
becomes problematic.  
France is impregnated by the centralized and planned production model. It is this model, 
institutionalized through both the economic knowledge and the materiality, which acts as a 
counterweight for assessing and discussing market opening. The controversy about the nuclear 
rent awakened a desire for industrial policy that several years of European legal control had put 
to sleep. It reactivated ―Colbertism‖ reflexes, which had not been completely buried either. An 
institutionalized economic model, presented as universal, always produce specific effects in a 
national context, due to technical, economic and cultural path dependency (Djelic and Quack, 
2007). 
A legal arrangement to develop competition in retail sales  
 While market opening in France was progressive, competitors were immediately tempted to 
develop their market share on segments open to competition. As of 2004, the market was opened 
to small business professionals. Competitors such as Direct Energie and Poweo were also present 
on this market segment.  
As they were not electricity producers, their main supply came from EDF. The European 
Commission obliged EDF to meet the supply of its competitors, in exchange for the authorization 
of the merger between EDF and EnBW. The decision outlined the transfer of considerable 
volumes of electricity in the form of ―virtual power plants.‖ EDF proposed these volumes of 
electricity at the market price. At the same time, in order to accelerate market opening, EDF 
negotiated agreements with Poweo and Direct Energie in order to sell electricity to them at an 
attractive price.  
Nevertheless, over the course of this period, prices on the wholesale market shot up. This meant 
that Direct Energie had to tackle a margin squeeze effect in dealings with its end user: the margin 
it was able to set aside, after taking into account its supply costs, aligned on wholesale market 
prices, and its sales prices, which were close to the regulated tariff (the ―blue‖ tariff) and to 
EDF‘s offer to professionals, was not enough to finance its activity. In 2007, Direct Energie 
asked the French Competition Council to intervene.  
In its decision
1
, the French Competition Council recognized the margin squeeze effect. It 
proposed to deal with Direct Energie‘s request within the framework of European law on 
competition. The Council made an analogy with the telecom industry, where the former public 
monopolies had been obliged to provide their competitors with services at prices affording them 
sufficient margins and competitiveness in relation to the end user. These services concerned 
access to the existing telecom network, considered as an ―indispensable input‖ to which 
competitors had to have access at a price reflecting the production costs.  
EDF wanted to prevent its competitors from selling the electricity they bought at low prices on 
the wholesale market owing to the income this would allow them to build up.  EDF thus recalled 
the risk of selling on the wholesale market the electricity purchased through the new disposition. 
The difference of price between the regulated contract and the wholesale price would 
mechanically create an opportunity for arbitrage. EDF therefore asked for an additional clause. 
This clause stipulated that electricity could only be sold by competitors to end users. The 
Competition Council‘s requirement only made sense in this ―dedicated‖ market where the margin 
squeeze effect could be observed. EDF asked for an additional mechanism to sanction the resale 
of electricity on the wholesale market. These proposals were finally validated by the French 
Competition Council in a second decision (after that competitor benefited from the arbitrage 
opportunity during 6 months). 
These legal arrangement introduced new elements of reasoning. Even if the reference to legal 
arguments and the use of judicial precedents remained very vague (considering nuclear power as 
an ―indispensable input‖ for competitors) it answered to the institutional pressures. The European 
competition authorities exerted considerable institutional pressure to open the market, including 
directly threatening EDF (financial sanctions, dismantling, etc.).  It was actually in the interest of 
EDF to develop competition. By proposing the price and showing that it was not really favorable 
to the idea, EDF wanted to show that it was contributing as much as it could to market opening 
and, in this way, maintain its institutional legitimacy. It wanted to demonstrate that it had set up 
the most favorable conditions possible for competitors to develop their market share: hoping in 
this way to make them responsible for the development (or the non-development) of competition.  
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 Decision 07-MC-04 of 28 June 2007 
Reference to the tariff and to the production and distribution costs played an important role in the 
debate and in the building of a final solution, which is paradoxical on an open market: in a 
liberalized market it is the market price that is supposed to act as a reference for calculating the 
tariff and not the opposite. However, for all the stakeholders, the production cost was considered 
more reliable than the market price. In other words, the costs were more institutionalized than the 
price.  
Designing a politically acceptable and euro-compatible market  
The mission entrusted to the Champsaur Commission by the Minister for the Economy and the 
Minister for the Environment was to put forward a French market organization that benefitted the 
consumer, served the competitiveness of the French economy and guaranteed control over 
electricity prices ―while meeting European liberalization requirements.‖ The letter of assignment 
recognized that the expectations were contradictory but expected the Champsaur Commission to 
set up a ―market design‖ that would reconcile these.  Paul Champsaur was the president of the 
french regulatory authority for the telecom industry. He had obtained a strong legitimacy with the 
opening of the French telecom market, especially by implementing asymmetrical regulation that 
considerably helped new market players to develop their market share. The Commission was 
made up of members of parliament and qualified individuals, including Jacques Percebois, an 
energy economist who regularly worked for the French Economic Analysis Council and was a 
specialist in energy markets and especially economic rent associated with energy production.   
When reviewing its letter of assignment, the Champsaur Commission also pointed out the 
contradictory nature of its mission. Up until then, solutions like the Tartam or the regulated tariff, 
while meeting expectations in terms of competitiveness and purchasing capacity, had not enabled 
the formation of a price signal to encourage energy savings or investments in new installations. 
The report also pointed out the problems related to the political acceptance and technical realism 
of a single European market where French nuclear power generation would provide a basis for 
other countries.    
The need for new regulations reintroduced strong interdependence between EDF, the French 
State and the European Commission. It should first be remembered that EDF are more engaged in 
market opening than they appear: the national champion EDF continues to gain market share in 
other countries. Having accepted the extension of EDF to other markets, the French State is 
indebted to its European partners. The French State should accept the opening of its market to 
other European suppliers.  
EDF participates in this system of interdependencies. EDF has to demonstrate to the European 
Commission that it is not preventing competition from developing in France. It has to 
demonstrate to the French general public that it is not getting richer to the detriment of the 
consumer. The acceptation of the redistribution of the nuclear rent by EDF is due to the fact that 
French State possessed 80 % of the capital of EDF and had the control of the EDF strategy…This 
capitalistic dependency played an important role in the cooperative strategy of EDF according 
political orientations.  
Despite its aggressive reaction against the new regulatory tariff, the European Commission also 
has a political understanding of the situation. It is aware of the low level of legitimacy behind the 
price rise and the risks of deindustrialization. Its main objective is nevertheless the reciprocity 
between European states, ie the opening of the French market, even if this requires 
rearrangements with some European principles. 
The report proposed and discussed two solutions. The first was to set up a tax on nuclear 
electricity production while letting EDF sell freely on the market. The tax would be based on the 
difference between the price on the wholesale market and the average production cost for base 
consumption.   
However, the report expressed a clear preference for ―regulated access to production for base 
load consumption.‖ Such a system required defining precise criteria for determining the quantity 
of nuclear electricity that suppliers would be entitled to. In the absence of such criteria, and 
according to arbitrage logic, suppliers would be rationally led to ask that all their nuclear 
electricity production be sold at the market price. To determine the quantity of nuclear electricity 
that suppliers would be entitled to, it was therefore decided that an ―objective, transparent and 
non-discriminatory‖ criterion be chosen: ―the consumption structure of the portfolio of customers 
residing in France.‖ 
But the industrial consumers believed less and less in the possibility of designing a euro-
compatible French market. They asked for the debate to be shifted to the European level and to 
―at last smooth out the dysfunctions of the European electricity market, which constitutes the 
only case of economic stalemate in the world.‖  
For academics, the Champsaur Commission‘s proposal was similar to a fair number of the 
readjustments implemented by States or regulation authorities to take into account the different 
political and structural dimensions of their market. By introducing a ―regulated sale‖ of base 
electricity, the French State was fabricating a specific market model that was very different from 
the standard model of an electricity market, and much more complex and therefore easier to 
manipulate. These readjustments had been analyzed many times by academics who had 
emphasized the economic risks and the costs of control. 
The main interlocutor to convince remains the European Commission. Nicolas Sarkozy formally 
asked Neelie Kroes, who heads the Directorate General for Competition, to abandon the 
condemnation of France in the Tartam-case, and committed himself to implement as soon as 
possible this new market organization. In his letter dated September 15
th
 2009, Prime Minister 
Francois Fillon explained the precise technical arrangements that should regulate the access for 
competing suppliers. The regulated sale of basic electricity by EDF is presented as "asymmetrical 
regulation of a dominant operator" to promote the entry of competition in the market. 
The Champsaur Commission considers that the existing base load is an "indispensable input" in 
the same way as the transportation and distribution network, which justifies a new entrant can 
access the facilities of the historical monopoly. This concept of "indispensable input" has the 
advantage to be extensive. It allows to redefine the perimeters of the market and monopoly. What 
is integrated in the scope of the indispensable input is valued in terms of historical cost or 
operating cost, while what is outside this perimeter is valued in terms of market price. 
The DG Competition approved this regulation because it facilitates the opening of the French 
market to European competitors. In its reply of the 15
th
 of September 2009, it recognizes that the 
historic investments in nuclear power and low production costs are a problem for the regulation 
of competition. The DG Competition admits for the first time that if the tariffs were abandoned, 
"consumers could probably benefit only to a limited extent from the benefits of competition." It 
assumes that the Champsaur proposal "is likely to provide a major lever for competition." 
Finally, it considers that the propositions are compatible with Competition law, even if it 
expresses some concerns related to the technical complexity of this new market model and to the 
risks of limiting the development of competition this may bring. 
Political negotiations in market redesign 
The New Electricity Market Law institutionalized the compromise of the Champsaur 
Commission. The different versions of the texts have been submitted to the Higher Energy 
Council, a representative body that was set up in 2002 with the main objective to advise the 
ministry in charge of energy. This body brings together members of parliament and senators, 
ministries, the State Council, representatives of regional and local authorities, suppliers and 
energy consumers. It has an advisory role. Its composition, particularly wide, should allow to 
identify the weaknesses of a text, thanks to the expertise of the different actors. The 
administration can test the various proposals, especially on a technical level. 
Between the initial work of the Champsaur Commission and new law, two important items were 
discussed: the scope of the power generation affected to the ―regulated access‖. During the work 
of the Champsaur Commission, a parallel negotiation affects the initial draft of the perimeter 
integrating all base load power generation. Base load has two parts: one (the majority) comes 
from historical nuclear power, while the other (also significant) comes from dams along the 
water, especially those operated by the Compagnie Nationale du Rhône (CNR), sold to Suez. But 
the hydro base load electricity disappeared from the final report. It entirely escapes from the 
―regulated access‖. 
For François Brottes, Socialist parliamentarian and member of the Champsaur Commission, 
"hydroelectric rent" was neglected: "The nuclear tree hides the forest of the dams [...] since the 
Commission dismissed the 12% hydropower, whose ultra-competitive costs should also benefit 
consumers". He communicated his disappointment in an interview: "I was very interested in the 
idea of regulated base load access. I also was very interested in finding a euro-compatibility. [...] 
At the end of the course, under government injunction, regulated access has moved from the base 
load to the historical nuclear power, with a focus on EDF ... Whereas my proposal was the entire 
base load power generation, including hydropower, which costs even less to produce than 
nuclear. This will be increasingly true when we incorporate the true cost of nuclear power. By 
taking this decision, the government changed its ethics. It is possible that a "deal" with GDF Suez 
has escaped to the Champsaur Commission. " 
According to the new law, GDF Suez will not have the obligation to sell the electricity at its 
production cost. This decision is most likely motivated by legal argument. GDF Suez would have 
been able to may contest the decision by filing an appeal with the State Concil, with the argument 
of the property rights acquired by the CNR. This legal risk has motivated the abandonment of 
hydraulics. "The legal dispute was certain. I always had the desire to avoid voting hypocrite laws, 
which could not be applied. We put our head in the sand. For Tartam it was politically the only 
solution for a difficult period, even if this rate was temporary. While there we face a very 
complicated legal debate. Very soon, everyone followed the argument of the historic nuclear and 
not the base load electricity, of which nobody was able to define the limits". This negotiation 
reveals the legal and technical fragility of new law. It shows that the law has been accepted by 
EDF because the state has kept the company's control as a majority shareholder. It is for this 
reason that the law can be seen as an institutional decoupling (Boyle and Meyer, 2002) since this 
market design betrays a fundamental principle. The only market actor with an economic interest 
in challenging this law, EDF, cannot challenge it because it would oppose its main shareholder, 
the French State.  
The key role of the Government is particularly evident in the definition of the price level at which 
nuclear power electricity is sold, a tariff called ARENH (regulated access to historical nuclear 
energy). The definition of the ARENH tariff opposed political power, administration, EDF and its 
competitors. EDF request at the start a rate of over 50 €/MWh to finance the renewal of the 
nuclear plants. Within the French administration, it was supported by the State Holdings Agency, 
which represents the State as shareholder and is therefore interested in dividends from the shares 
of EDF possessed by the State. Nevertheless, there was a strong political pressure on the 
Government by the members of the administration in order to keep prices as low as possible, but 
they also question the risk of an asphyxiation of EDF. The administration defends a price of 
about € 38/MWh based on its own knowledge of the nuclear costs. For its part, GDF Suez defend 
another evaluation of costs, based on its nuclear facilities which is about 35 €/MWh. The debates 
were organized around the available economic data and calculations of operating costs and 
investment. In these technical discussions, each actor was required to justify its economic choices 
and to demonstrate that it defends the collective interest. After this confrontation, the new CEO 
of EDF, Henri Proglio, obtained from the government that it chosen the Tartam as reference for 
the definition of basic electricity sales price (42 €/MWh). 
This political intervention in the market organization reflects the place of electricity in France. If 
the political issues inspire the new law, the orientations are convergent with the traditional model 
of the French electricity sector: public planning, centralization, political control of prices, nuclear 
production.  
Conclusion: The flexibility of institutionalized economic model 
The liberalization of the electricity sector in Europe has resulted in the creation of national 
electricity markets with the same model as reference, in the perspective of the European 
integration. These markets are based on a set of reasoning that cannot be discussed a priori, that 
are highly valued because they are supported by economic expertise, and they comply with the 
formal rules in force (Scott, 2001). These markets have been defined in relation to the regulatory 
authorities that share common economic expertise. 
However, during its implementation in France, the electricity market model has been strongly 
contested. Industrial consumers have shown that it couldn't fulfill the promise it defended. Its 
contradictions were revealed by the price increase. The contestation has caused a loss of 
legitimacy of the market model. Accordingly, the liberal reform of the electricity sector has 
adopted a much more exploratory and uncertain path that had profoundly affected the credit 
attributed to the institutionalized market model. This weakening has led to a politicization of 
conception of markets, with several interventions by political authorities. 
In this process of exploration within the liberal reform, we can thus distinguish two market 
regulation logics that do not rely on the same forms of legitimacy and do not maintain the same 
relationship with economic expertise and the institutionalized model: the intervention of the 
political authorities and the regulation by independent authorities. These terms and the authorities 
that carry them are in competition with each other, especially when faced with situations of 
challenge or crisis. 
The regulatory authorities, whether specialized in energy or in competition, defend a first mode 
of regulation. The legitimacy of regulatory authorities is based on the legal definition of their 
delegations and on their technical expertise, which should be as universal as possible. That is why 
they tend to rely on already institutionalized market models, models that have been theorized and 
justified. There is however differences: the French Competition Council is not specialized in the 
field of energy, which allows it to imagine new solutions inspired by other sectors, while the 
French Energy Regulatory Commission remains faithful to the international standard for 
electricity market in its opinions and declarations. But the competencies of the French ERC, 
defined by Parliament, is limited to a technical intervention. It can not oppose parliamentarian‘s 
decision as the Tartam or New Electricity Market Law. The Directorate General for Competition 
has a much higher authority, because it can impose a decision on Member States. It interacts with 
the network of national regulatory authorities with the aim to standardize the electricity markets 
in Europe and to foster economic integration. So, these three authorities don't have the same 
relation to economic standards and rules: the French Competition Council is vigilant about 
national economic equilibrium, the French Energy Regulatory Commission and the Directorate 
General for Competition defend only the European energy directives and a standardization of 
market design in Europe, even if it produce economic disequilibrium.  
The second source of regulation is the intervention of political authorities, governments and 
parliaments. It has often been presented as a modality in decline inside the economic field. 
However, this intervention is back in crisis situations, when regulation by laws and standards is 
contested. Political intervention has greater latitude from the requirements of legal and technical 
legitimacy because it benefits from the elective legitimacy. It takes account of distributional 
effects of reform and political risks associated with the economic transition. The political 
authorities first are reasoning on economic effects, on the consequences in terms of price and 
economic stability. They do not assess the market in terms of compliance with international or 
European standards. They are more receptive to alternative expertise if these can question 
standard and serve their political strategy. They can be sources of proposals in the redesign of the 
market organization.  
These various sources of regulation are articulated to each other in a system of interdependencies. 
Political authorities need technical legitimacy. They can rely on an expert administration, but 
they may also need the legitimacy of regulatory authorities. The autonomous space in which 
political actors act when it comes to the regulation of markets is not defined a priori. The 
distribution of roles doesn't take place in the constitutional principles or general institutional 
rules. It rebuilt itself at an ad hoc basis during confrontations or put to mutual tests. The frontier 
between what is technical and what remains political is not stabilized. The autonomy of political 
authority is reconstituted in a continuous confrontation with the regulatory authorities. 
This autonomy can develop in the space left by the weakening of the economic doctrine on which 
the regulatory authorities base themselves. The more this doctrine has weaknesses, 
inconsistencies, with visible effects that can be grasped politically, the more independent 
authorities lose legitimacy and the more they are forced to concede margins for political 
authorities. The intervention of the French Competition Council is indicative of the weakness of a 
competition authority in a very unfavorable political context. The weight of the political actors in 
the regulation depends on both their ability to deconstruct the institutionalized standards and their 
ability to reformulate technical issues as political issues. 
In an exploratory economic reform, policies and autonomous regulatory authorities are as well 
complementary as rivals: the political authorities can instruct the debate and seek solutions when 
the market fails to guarantee an acceptable political balance, but they must reach to defend their 
proposals before the regulatory authorities, who will reassess their legitimacy. At the heart of 
their dialogue, economic expertise provides reference models, but also the means to anticipate 
and evaluate possible solutions and effects. Moreover, criticism of economic models doesn't 
always require a position outside the economic expertise and its modes of reasoning. It may, on 
the contrary, find there very strong arguments. This criticism has widely used economic 
expertise, without being influenced with a normative stance in favor of the market standard. The 
strong pretension of economic knowledge to build "efficient" markets may turn against them as 
soon as the actors can prove that knowledge, hitherto anchored as beliefs, are not validated. This 
knowledge comes to be discussed and tested as scientific or technical hypotheses. Nevertheless, 
the burden of proof is on the side of the critics of the market and not of its promoters. Criticism is 
expensive, it needs to rely on alternatives. 
In an industry that meets strong economic cycle effects, criticizing the market is easier when it 
offers higher prices, and less easy when it offers low prices. In a context of liberalization and 
development of competition, the political legitimacy of the economic interests of customers is 
often superior to supplier one, always accused of benefiting from their oligopolistic position. 
Thus, the political obstacles to the market are stronger when market prices are higher than 
average production costs. Borenstein and Bushnell (2014) observed this phenomena in the United 
States. The market model is progressing, thanks to political support, when market prices are 
lower than average production costs, and it does not progress or even regresses, when the 
relationship between prices and costs reverse. In France, the policy goes beyond: when market 
prices exceed the average costs of production, industrial clients obtain a return to the references 
of costs, when prices are above, they benefit from the price from the market. 
This case study allows us to specify the conditions of a decoupling between an institutionalized 
model and local practice. Patricia Bromley and Walter Powell (2012) suggest a new type of 
decoupling, not simply between rules and practices but between the desired effects of a rule or a 
standard, and the effects observed after the implementation. These gaps result from decoupling 
between means and ends: the rules or models do not guarantee the announced result. Such 
decoupling can be explained by the complexity, globalization and liberalization of economies, 
which multiply couplings and uncertainties. In the case of the electricity market, the liberal 
reform do not lead to the expected effect, the announced promise (lower prices, economic 
efficiency in terms of allocation). As we have shown above, if the cognitive and normative pillars 
of the market (the belief in its effectiveness) no longer support the general rule (competition and 
the standards that normally apply to it), economic and political actors can step into the breach to 
defend the legitimacy of a changing of the rule, or of a circumvention if the rule is immutable. 
Thus, a means-ends decoupling would lead to a second decoupling between the rules and 
practices: the loss of legitimacy of a rule can impact the entire chain of the application and 
monitoring of this rule. 
With flexibility in models and rules, the institution "market" can survive economic cycles and 
political and technical controversies. Within the institution, a hierarchy of requirements exists, 
from the indispensable on which we can not compromise, the uncertain that can be reshaped, and 
the accessory that can be given up. The confrontation between the issues raised by political actors 
and the evaluation by regulatory authorities allows to focus on the essential requirements. In the 
studied case, the issue of competition has emerged as the main requirement, while European 
economic integration by an electric price defined at European level, has been tempered by 
controversy and became a debatable requirement. The second essential requirement was the 
promise of lower prices: if prices do not fall, politics refuse the market price. The institution 
"Electricity Market" thus has some flexibility around a pivot, the idea of competition and its 
promise of lower prices, and political action and independent regulatory authority collaborate in 
order that the market organization responds to these requirements even while taking liberties with 
the international standards. 
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